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Heller on the Ancients
Agnes l!cller once made the comlllent that all philosophers, after
the ancient Greeks. fIJI I into one of tWO essential groups: philosopher.~
follow either Pluto or Aristotle. llowever refined and extensive one's
classical interesls might he. ;IS a philosopher one nnus oneself either
in the lrain of Aristotle fir of Plato. In 1966. Heller publi~hed a book
on Aristutle' s ethics; her moral works continued 10 rely upon readings
of Aristotle thereafter. Yet llc1ler has not wriuen a singk book. t~) lily
knowledge, thai is not peppered Wilh references to the Platonic corpus. All E,1Iics of Pers(J/wfity hinges on a distinctive reading of Plato
that underscores bOlh his immanent ethics and his resJlonsibility for
the metaphysics oftranscentknce.ln recent essays. Heller has extended her claims for PI;JIO's modernity, for his unique ethics, and for his
unpamlleled and founding aeslhetic creation of at least two literJry
genre.... one of which is philosophy. Beyond the usual truisms at least
as old as Raphael's Sc1l0(l/ of Allu!IIs. whal <lccounts for such a stark
divide between Pl<l1O and his studcnI? And where does Heller see herself? Although Ileller often addresses different br•.lIlches of each
Plato's and Arislotle's Ihought. I wilt focus almost exclusively on
Heller's understanding of the concept of justice in both thinkers. II is
my hope thaI. hy more closely following her <lnalysis of justice in both
PlatO and Aristotle, some of the depth of IIeller's engagement with the
ancients, and of their presence in her decidedly modern thought. can
be made manifest.
Ilellcr's 1996AII Elllic~ofl'el'.\'()/wliIY i.~ lhe third and last work of
her moral philosophy.1 Joachim. an interlocutor in the uialogue.~ th,l1
form its middle division, plays, ill p,lrt, the mle of Heller's Kanlian
, 1kllcr.
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mask. Joachim's comments about Plato's ethics :lre tclling, for
Joachim follows Kanl himself in tracing a genealogical trajeclOfy
from Kant back to PI;J!o. This trajectory will prove indispensahle for
understanding Jlcller's reading of Plato. In the Critique of /'uI"e
Reasoll, Kanl cretlits Plalo with first recognizing thaI Ideas arc culled
neither from sense experience nor frollllhe undcrstanding,Z Ideas :lre
cognitive archetypes, mental markers lh:'l\ allow us to grasp the regular arrangemcm of natural structures and that become erticiclll causes
in 1110f:.ll decision-making, when reason jointly posits the guiding
maxim "nd the universal imperative 10 test i!.~ merit. A transcendental
Idea, Kant argues. J'/IOIl'S its effective presence where human reason
proves to be causal, whClher in providing the unity necessary for scientific explanation or the orielllalion in thinking necessary for free.
ethical action. Yet ultimately. Kant admits, Iranscendental Ide:ls are
neither arbitrarily invented nor evidentially certain. The Ideas that
ground our moral bearing in the world are problems, givclIllecessarity to reason by reason itself: while the origin of transcendental Ideas
cannot be provcn, their fecundity and thcir inexorability in guiding
our actions cannot be legitimately denic~l. Kant enjoins his readers,
therefore, to preserve the term !d('11 in its founding. PlalOnic sense,
which he takes to be crafted 10 express precisely the cognitive COIllposition tll;lt he too elaborates. J Even if. Kant writes, PlalO did not
understand his own position on the n;l1ure of lucas in just this way,
Ihcn Kant claims to understand Plato better than Plato understood
hirnself.~ Plato may have sometimes wrinen in a W;IY contrary 10 his
intentions; but jus I these deeper intentions, Kalll declares, ;Ire also his
OWl!.

Ileller, or her mask Joachim, agrees. Joachim :Irgues Ihat in the
two paradigmalically ethical dialogues, the GII"g;II~· and the Rep/lblic.
Plato shows Socrates dcploying the furthest reaches of ralional argu-

I K~I\l. tmmJrllld, Cri,i'l"e oj I'",-~ ",e"~m,, Guyer. Paul. WOtld. I\llen W.. lr/cJ ..
CambriJl(c, Camhridl(c Ullicvr>ily I'rc~s, 19')11. BJ70 ff.
llhid. BJ76
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ment in order to prove, definitively, that it is beller to suffer injustice
than it is to commit iLs But Socrates fails. Via Plato's staging, it
becomes clear that the founding statement of moral philosophy (it is
better to suffer than commit injustice) cannot be proven. Yet this
assertion is the I/rdU! that will potentially ground and extend our
moml thought and action; if it is untrue, then morality is impossible.
Plato presents Socr:ttes' rational failure as well as his real commitIllent ttl the moral assertion; he presents Socfiltes' lived philosophy.
As stich, Plato pushes us to consider the value of an unconditioned
absolute, together with the knowledge that our iuternal principle rests
upon a pre·philosophil·al, even tautological position. All the while,
Joachim goes on to ask, virtually quoting lIeller's Gel/emf F)hics,6
good people and bad people exist - so how are they possihle? lie concludes, with Plato's Socrates, "We lllust go aheall and prove that
which :lvoids proor."
Plato illVenlellthe supreme Idea of the Goollto point the way Ollt
of this riddle. In Joachim's words: lie invented the philosophical
myth of recollection to provc his point, and in the sallle act he inventcd the l:mguage game which we have since been calling metaphysics.
Through this detour he finally succeeded in connecting knowledge
and morals. If you know the idea of the Oood- you arc good. The idea
becomes the source of knmvledge aud of goodness.7
In Joachim's tdling, Kant replaces the Platonic Idea of the Good
with the moml law, severing the uml>ilical cord between knowledge
and morality. Yet what else, the reader is led \0 ask, is the Good if not
the pmctical, regulative principle that we access when seeking the !lest
answers 10 our moral questions? Heller's take on the mailer emerges
in a subsequent exchange between Joachim and his interlocutor,
Lawrence. Lawrence asserts "If you probe", deeper into the bc:tuti-

, tkller, A~ne~. All /:;'Ili.·s "f l'erS</I/Illily, C~l1llJridge. B\~~kwelll'l,Iblishers, 1m;, t 996,
t20.
'I leller, Agnes, G~"a<ll elhics. Camhridge. Blackwell 1'l,Ibtisllers, Inc, t9l:1l:1.
1 Ilcllcr, Agnt's, All Erhics "f I'as",wlil)', C~Hlbrid&e, Bbt'kwcll Publbhcrs, lilt:, t 996.
12U.
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ful scnICI\CC~. of Plaia, you will sec Ihal he too often sCllled arguments with lllelaphors."~ Joachim counters: "lie invented better
lllCI:lphors."

llellcr, like K'lnl, asks us 10 regard [he conceptual initiatives of Ihe
Greeks as symbolic indicators. Heller's affinity with the Platonic figurative imagination nOlwithstanding. her intention is 10 probe Ihe
development of Plato's imagism. I leller. that is. docs not just deploy
:1 genealogist's investigation of ancien! initimivcs; she makes a claim
for the application of P1;llonic ideas, a.~ regulative ideals. Iler Beyond
JlIs/ice makes this progr:llil explicit. In a scclion tilled "nle philosophical idea of juslice and the paradox of rcason," Heller clears the
dead wood from the ground of a Chri.~tian, O( Christianizing
Platonism: to iruerpret Plato's ideal repunl ic as the vision of a redeeming par:ldise, to identify Pl:lto's concept of justic~ with a real, if otherworldly 'just city', is to miss "both the complexity of Plato's argument and the perplt=xing /IIm/emity of his approach.''9 In Plato, Heller
claims, man-made justice r.:onclmles in the parJdox of reason; it is
Plato's genius to fully articulate lhi.~ paradox. Ilere again, Heller
focuses on the Gorgias :l!1d the Republic. seeing in them the clearest
concentration on the question of how 'righteousness is possible with·
in the framework of pure practical reason.' On Heller's reading of the
Phuonic paradox. Philo discovers and presents the insight that evil
involves a misuse of reason. lIad he spoken dimctly, rather than
through Socrate.~, the force of lhis insight would have dissipated.
Instead, Plato lhe swge-desigller or tragio-comic poet embeds his
insight into lhe argument itself, prescming "the argument of lh~
action."1Il Plato knows that we know that Socratcs, unable to prove
th:lt it is beller 10 suffer than commit injustice l>y rational argument a-

'Ibid. 17<).
"Heller. Agnes. II..)",,,} JUl'li..". Cambridl1c. Bbckwclll'ublishcrs. Inc. I<)K7.lH.
Selh Ilenardclc's phrasc (llenardclc. Serh. Sualll"s' Sn'01ld S<lilillg: A" I'I",,,'S
H"I'I,blle. Chicagu_ Universily of ChieJl10 Press. 19K').; lIcnmJele. Seth. Th" Bow "lid
111" Lyr,,: II "/u!il/lic H"mUlIg of III.. Odyesl"rY. r-,-tarylall.J. I(uwman amI Lilllcfid.J
I'ubli'hcrs.lnc. 1<)lJ7.).
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tiCll1. all the while lived and L1ied hy his belief. In reading lhe PJalOni(;
-.1;,....\ =.U·~~.

"NoC.

ur~ ~rl~~rc$~,-t! ~ct merel)' in lhe t11ac!\inat\ n of logie-.al

or dw)ecllca) proceilure; we are iascllIated, a. 'IS Pl:no,'by a So rale.
who ultimately obey: only the voice of his own can cience, and who
doe not yet know the fate thut it. principle will occasion. Knowing
of aerate' end, we are captivated by hi. cour. e, and Plato exploit.
or invent every Iitera.ry trope and form neces ary 10 pre. ent aerates
to us in an of hi capti ::sting iuiosyncra. y. \n Hd\er's word, Plato
captures Ihe e sential Socratic geslIlre. the act of authentic righteousness which no argument can ju tify anI.! which lurk behind all of hi.
argumellls. IJ
But beyond this separation of wliter from ubject, oramalk narrator from commilled ethicist, I leller takes the Platonic innovation, 'the
persrective of this gesture of the future', to be itself a moral imperative. For Socrate is pictured in dialogue with men - in Ihe Republic
and the Gorgjas they are Polus. Adimantus, and Glaucon - who, while
omewhat inclined toward right action or moral goodness, are also
compelled hy rhe ;lrgU/TIenr. in rnv r of injustice hy alii les.
Thra. ymachus, or their inheritors. Socrates' younger companion are
men who stand in the middle of ethical possibilities, and are hence
their focal point. Heller think. orthe clash between ocrates, Wilh his
arguments in favor of ju.tice, on the one hand. and Callicles or
Thra. ymachu . favoring injustice on the other, a u \Vager. The wager
i. staked by th warring repre. entatives of righleoLlsne . and malice,
but they do not bet their own souls. for Illey are already decided,
Rather. the ante i the men lanLiing in the middle of ethical pas ibililie • inclined toward the ju., t bUI also intrigued by the unjust. Th
wager between Socrate. and the purveyor. of inju. tice, in I-IcHer'.
telling. is all about convincing the average per. on to choose, finally,
one alternati e over the other.
This is Socrates' wager, and it is . taked and fought out in Ih
realm of dialectics. But whal is ultimately convincing, if anything. i.
Socrale ' rousing and application of what II Iler calls the "charisma
Il

lIelier. Agnes. Beyond Jllslice. Cambridge. Blackwell Publishers. Inc, 19117. 65.
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of goodness. "l~ The invitation thai SocrJIC!s issues. 10:1. jU'it life and its
defense. is rerfonnativc. E"cn where Socr::lIes explicitly summons us
10 the good life. the sense of his ~'ords is constrUcted. by P!:l.Io. in the
context of Socrates' own life. And Ikller finds thallhe portr'J,yal of
Socrates' life. as well as the r~sentalion of the myths that fill the
PI:lIonic dialogues. are "placed in the scales in :m altemp' 10 win the
wager (artbe: souls of these men orille: middle ground.'·lJ h is Images.

finally, whether of mythologized philosophers or their mythic offspring. on which we fix our sights when caught up in the turmoil of
~al ethical difficuhies. From out of the darl:enet1langle that mind and
world have cast abeln. the clarity of one good rerson magnetizes us;
one symbolic image may dr.lw us on n~ unerringly than any logical proof. It is no accident, then, thatlleller's Joochim connecls Plato
wilh Kant, butlleller seems 10 favor Kant's reading of Plato even over
Joachim's: for the mOr.l1 law does not finally sever Ihe lie between
knowledge and goodness. On the conlrary, Kant's revaluation of the
regulalive power of Pbtonic ideas is on par with Ileller's appreciation
of the same. lllOUgh we cannOi pml't! the supersensible origin of reason, th~ good will. or the momllaw. our ulilization of them, \'ia trJ.n·
scendental or regulative ideas, continues to extend knowledge within
Ihe bounds of immanence and to support ~oodness without the guar·
antee of eanhl)' recompen.~e. Moreover,just as Kant will go on, in the
third Cr;tiqlle.'~ 10 argue that aesthetic apprecialion of the Beautiful
prepares us for the rigors of transcenucl\tal argumentation, lleller sees
in Ihe Pl:lIonic ponmyal of beautiful, harmonious souls, and in the
heauty of the Platonic dialogue as a unified whole, a route of emolional access and hence a melhod of aesthelic education which speaks
to the facets of Ihe psyche lhat reason either fails to reach or fails 10
sway.

u lboJ. ti4.

Il 1bi.J. 66•
.. K:lIIl.lmm;anud. CrilllfU" u{tfl" 1·"'...., of JuJ,NII''I1. I'aut GuYCI ed.. I';ou1 Guya:llld
Enc r.!;atlbc...·s u .• Cunbrid~. ClInbrllilc Umvcnny I'rn:l., 2(lX),
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[lut Plato also st:.lges his insight tll;lt evil, originating neither in
human nature nor human conventions, is nothing other than peYl't'/"/l'tt
reaJOn. 11 In Socr:ltes' respective clashes with Callicles :.lnd
Thrasymachus, each of the men proceed 10gic;11Iy, and each argucs
wcll, Evcn if ThrOlsylllachus is quickly reduced to a foolish cmotional
outburst, l!clfcr finds Socrates' claim, at the close of Book J of the
Republic, that he still docs not know what justice is, to be a corresponding comic jest. The point, for IleJlcr, is lhat whilc Socr:ltes'
argumcnts, his wager, issue from the "clownish knight of rightcousncss." their supp0r! of thc proper use of reason will only come 10 light
iIlJOfl/I'm' hI' wiJu'/lie 1I'1/8t'/". Plato knows that Socratcs cannot win by
argument alone; if he is tll stage Socr:ltes' w:lger, SUl,:cessfully linking
rea,~on wilh goodness, and the misusc of re:.lson with evil, then Plato
must "tip the balance" in favor of Socrates and thus in favor of the
long route into philosophy.
So Thr;lsymachus, prcsaging one Nictzschean theme, is wrinen to
arguc that IIIII' or convcntion (Nomos) is nothing bUl an ex.pression of
power, laid down by thosc who havc the strength to SCi values, and the
interest in ex.tcnding thcir rule. lllf:lsymachus's righteous person, in
obcying the bw, unwittingly :.lcts in the interesl of thc Ulljll.~t, the lawgivcrs. Since injusticc is nothing other than a person's own prolit and
interest, and sincc we are born into a world of injusticc,
Thrasymachus concludes that we would be happier and freer if we too
wcrc unjust, disregarding the laws of othcrs and looking oilly to our
own intercsts.
Calticlcs, anticipating :lnothcr Nietzscheall line, that of the 'slave
revolt in morality', argues Ihat thc wcak band together in mutual fear
and hatred of the strongcr, and devise rules for kecping the strong in
check. The wC;lk want an equ:ll sharc of all rcsources, although 1I1Ililre
woultl have provided them with far less. Still, tndy strong indivitluals
will rcspond to nature alld not to human law; they will smash con-

II l!cller,

Agne~,

H.'yoml JUIlia, CUlIllJridgc, Blackwell l'ubli.hcn, 11ll:, 1987.69.
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vent ions ;llld crush their written <lnd institutional control centers. With
Ihis, the sirong will remind us of Ihe fe'll justice of nature, ag:linsl
which any argument for human rit;htcousness pales.
Heller argues that PliHO, the dramatist, is curious to see how deep
the arguments of the .~ophisIS may go, [0 test their strength for himself. What Plato's Callic1cs and TIlnlsymachus hold in common is
th:ll, in making the case for injustice. Ihey cadi make a case for human
'freedom as against the .fll/Yell of being subjected to IIOnlB'. "I~
J lappincss. each sophist aims to show, is incompatible with the virtue
or the freedom of the citizen. Ca11itles and Thrasymachus argue 111m
we can only be free. and happy in our freedom. insofar as we ritl ourselves of extern:ll authority. l1lis is their shared political position. And
both Thrasymachus anti Callicles, with tliffercntlevels of sophistication. argue that any illlernal authority which might command obedience to external laws is but a hyproduct or a .~hadow of external
authority. which must be shetl for the sake of freedom and happiness.
Essentially. no real internal authority e",its; this is the sophists' shared
moral position.
What Plato grasps, according to Ileller. is that his representative
sophists arc right - insofar as they prefigure the awareness that I'l'i/
stcms neither from human natufC nor from human laws. Rather, people become evil by following evil principles; people become evil by
rei.lsoning themselves anti others into the position that injustice i.~
preferable to justice. Ileller again chooses Kantian concepts to explain
a Platonic insight: evil is a /llI/xilll for :.!cting in an evil way. The
shnred maxim of Plato's sophists is .no norlll is valid': and. if 110 norm
is v:Llitl. one shoultl disregard all norms and e"'pect all others to do Ihe
same. The f;let th;lI laws are had. or th:lt we may ob.~erve evil reward·
cd and goodness ignored or punished is not evil in itself; what is evil
i.~ "arguing on behalf of these thing.~." It is in this sense that evil is
nothing other than perverted re;lson, and lhat Pl:tto's position. in
lIdler's wonls, is "breathtakingly modem." The paratlo'" of reason is

"Ibid. 69.
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sharpened nOl only <It the limits of rational argumcllt<ltion confining
Socmtcs, in his attel1lpt.~ to argue that it is beuer to suffer than tlo
injustice, bw :ll.m here, where corre.~poJldjllg ;IQ,luments allow Ihe
counter-position to shine. Callicles, in particular, does not ;lrgue irrationally; on the contrary, his perversion of reason m:lnifests in his
ability to poison conscience and respect with well-argued reasoning.
Without Plato's authorial 'gesture of the future', without his tipping
of the balances that convey to us the charisma of Socrates' goodness,
we would have no good reason to reject Callicles.
Ilcller, it was said, claims that Socrates can only win his wager for
the rational and moral commitment of all of us occupying the middle
ground. if his arguments for the right usc of reason trump those for the
lllisuse of rcason. Shc also claims that, givcn the paradoll, of rcason he
identifies, Plato must Iherefore tip the balances, or provide another
sort of argument in and through the action of the dialogue. Once
again, Heller links Pbto's method with Kant's: for Socrates is written
to argue for good, as against pervcl1ed reason. by proceeding from
common sense to philosophy - just as Kant docs two millennia later
in the Gmwulwork of/he Meltlphy.\·it·.\· (lJ Moral.f./ 7 Working through
the arguments Socrates defends in the Republic:, Heller shows how
Socrates' position, while remaining consistent, also consistently bottolllS nut; Socrates cannot make his case on common sense alone.
Beginning together in the commonsensical, Socrates takes his inter~
loclltor.~ to the logical conclusions allli mythic counterparts of his
arguments, while Plato takes the reader into the slowly emerging
necessity of philosophy.
Upon realizing th<ll he still does not know what justice is, 31 the
close of Book I, Socrates ;Isks us 10 consider the city - if only
metaphorically, as the soul writ large. Making the city-soul connection will allow Socrate.~ to address the dual shortcomings - both political and ethical - of the arguments of perverted reason. On Iletler's

11
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reading, the republic Socr:Jte.~ builds can be umlerstood as a polysemic symbol, offering three '1crsiollS, of increasingly rational sClISitivity, of the vision of just icc ;.IS authentic rightcollsness. In the first
version, Socrates presents the "utopia of the city," in which the justit'e
of the body politic, likc that of its corresponding soul, relies upon the
strict separation of its different. internal elements (whether social
castes or vi niles). 13m SocrJtes is lllotivated by the question of
whether it is beller to do or suffer injustice, and in the utopian city,
this question has been circumvented. 1101 answered. No one suffers or
commits injustice in the ide:l1 city, and justice is discernible only formally, ill the merit of the city as a whole. Presented with this utopian
figure, we lind that we C:lIl press still harder on our common scnse
assumptions ahout justice, for the fundamental question sustaining
them h:Js not been allSwered.
In the second version of his symbol, a city ruled by philosophers
is founded, in other words, philosophy is institutionalized. Plato tells
us that in philosophy. one may set up as m:lllY cities as one likes:
indeed. each philosopher sets lip his own "city in the sky."
Philosophy. here, already is the utopian ideal I1wde real; whoevcr
lives within it is already righteous. Still, the truth behind our COIllmOllSense assumptions about justice is thwarted, for the philosopher
raises questions alxlut doing or suffering ir~ustice not because he docs
not know what to do - for he docs know; he is already jus\. The
philosopher either raises these questions ironically, as a rhetorical
exercise he pr:lctices on himself. or sincere!y, but then only for others
- in the battle for the ethical commitments of other people who lack
his unfi;Jpp;Jble security. So the philosopher sl;Jys within philosophy,
essenti;Jlly unrufnetl by the question of justice, having sufficiently
answered it, or he leaves the city of philo.~ophy, on a rescue mission
to bring others back into il. The parable of the cave most .~harply
underscores this option.
The third ;Jill.! mOSl sublime version of the republic returns to
Socr;Jtes' assertiollthat he only wanled, in envisioning a city, to view
lhe soul writ large. Ilere again, the city i.~ the psyche. but in order to
think :Jbout ii, we have used, and climbed free of, the conceptu'll lad-
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der firsl developed 10 make sense of the ohscur~ soul. In this soul,
there IS no circumscribed difference between discrete e1emellt.~ whose
vinue is to keep to themselves. On the contrJ.ry. now wilh clear
notions of (,."Oumge and temperJncc in mind. we also have the wisdom
to combine them. Unity is the mark of the complete soul; it is indestructible on accoulII of i1s internal cohesion. The harmonious soul is
without violent r~giment:llion, This soul belongs to the person of con·
science - he follows laws strictly. but only laws he himself. with
philosophic:!l :!curnen :!nd deduction. pn:scribes. Plato's Kantianism,
in Ileller's telling. is once again at the fore.
nut lIeller's intemion is not merely to exhibit the continuity
bctweenthe IWO gre:!t idealists; her point is that. unlike in Kant's writing. PlalC) means to show that. aI all three levels of interpret:lIion.
Socrates' republic fails. We 1If.'I'('r know why it is beller to suffer than
do injustice. for even at the third, most sublime level. philosophical
wisdom, concerned wilh the unity of the soul. lays down the law.
Reason posits and follows its own law. wherever the soul, in its internal unity anc.1 freedom from extern:!1 constraint. is JUSI and sovereign.
The paradox of reason is lhat reason will lead to unreason; Plato
shows that this pal"'Jdox can be productive depending upon the type of
faith to which it Ic:!d.s. As Socrates :!dmits in nook VII of the
R/'I'l/hlic. anyone who merely follows the principles of moroJlily prescribed by parents, st:!le. religion or another external authority can hi:
swa),ed by the anti-aulhoritarianism of a Thrasymachus. ll Reasons
lIlay always be mel head on with contrary reasons. Yet none of the
three versions of Socrates' republic gives way to alwrirl or /'IHJche.
Ileller argues that the first utopia of the city. with its avoidance of the
primary question of justice, must lead 10 faith in an otherworldly or
utopian juslice. The second city ruled b), philosophers. or philosophy
itself. leads 10 faith in Ihe authority of the philosopher. or 10 the

I' I'l~lo, C"IIC'( lC'd l)i"l"xucs. 1bllllhun, l!.Jilh :lnoJ C:dIM, lluntinglon cd.• l'rillCcloo,
l'nllCC"101l Unl"c~ity PrCM, 19tt9, S3lk,c,lIcllcl, I\l:nc~. H<')''tmd J"nirt, C:lInbr1l.lgc,
8bd"y,'d\ 1'Ilbhshcn..IIIC. t9'61.13
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philosopher's faith in the authority of his own knowledge of good~
ness. In philosophy, it is always true thai it L~ helter to suffer than do
injustice; for so the authority of philosophy speaks. And again as
regards the city within, the psyche, the paradox of rcusonlcads 10 faith
in a revelation, viz. to the surely gnllltcd by having gained sight of the

IdeaS.
Heller's Plalo .'leIs the pumuox of reason into three configurations,
each of which give way \0 a kind of faith: in olher-worldly justice. in
philosophical authority. and in spiritual revelation. Each form of faith
speaks Wilh power [0 reason. So the (jucstion i.~ not whether rcason
cun resist power, it cannot. It remains only to decide which power we
will introUuce to reason. Socrates has no argument against obeying his
own daimon. or the laws of the stme. or the edicts of gods or their oracles. lIelier's Plato, though, is most interested in studying the pith of
the command-obey configuration in souls and cities; for with it, he
uncover.~ and gives voice to a crisis in the ethico-polilical concept of
justice. It can never be proven that it is beller to suffer th:m do injustice, yet in philosophy, this is always already granted as true - for the
founding of the city of philosophy is itself the demonstration of this
truth. Plato is not simply saying thm moml and ration'll maturity
require philosophy; he is asserting, even more specifically, that ollly
through, in lIeller's words, "firmness in the acceptance of an e;<;tcrnal
authority can internal authority (conscience) truly develop as pure
conscience:'19 The faith we have in an external authority, whether it
is the mor..l 1:IW, lhe philosophic'll wisdom of our forebears, or a transcendent ideal. provides lile orientation necessary when reason fails to
guilie us. lIence, Plato paints a day's picture of Socrates always
against the backdrop of his life and death; he fills Socrates' speeches
with myths that underscore lhe value of resolve, justice, and of the
innuence of other worlds upon this one. in order to inspire our faith in
one of the par<ldigms of external <Iuthority necessary for intern'll
development.
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The W:lgcr that Pl<lto slages Socf<lles m<lking, <lnd the paradox of
reason th:.t occasions it, fade from view in Aristotle's work. For
Aristotle, justice is a mean betwecn doing and suffering injusticc - the
definition fairly clearly guides thc deliberative process that any actor
should undertake when faced with an ethical issue. In Stoicism and
Epicureanism, the wagcr and the paradox arc completely abscn!. By
the timc of late antiquity, lIellcr writes, righteousness has become <I
Jlurely ethical concept; in commilting <lcts of justice, people are
advisell 10 be indifferent 10 <lll injustices they may h<lve suffcred.:!II
The slOry Ileller tells <loom the development of the concept 'justice'
may be appreciated for the twists, turns and subplots of its historical
hi.lppening. Heller finds th<lt, even more than Plato, Aristotle understands thai the philosophical cOIlcepls he <lddre.~ses arc more like
characlers in our lives or on the world st<lge we have before us.
Indeed, the idea that concepts may be beth:r addressed, in all their dramatic, historically s:Jturated individuality, as ch:Jractcrs, is taken on
most explicitly in lIeller's 1993 t\ I'hilO!iopliy of lJis/(Jry ill
FragmelJls, in which she introduces, and puts on display, "Reason,
Will and Other Characters" - to borrow the title of one chapter.~1
Ileller finds that Aristotle, beholding the spectacle of the philosophical ch:lracters that a couple hundred yei.lrs of philosophizing performed, h;ld to "compose his pli.ly on an entirely new set."ll Aristotle
lOok up the One, the Many, the True, Motion, Rest - the whole compi.lny - and revolutionized their inleri.lctions and their purpose. The
conclusion of Aristotlc's dramatic revolution is his metaphy.~ics,
which Heller goes on 10 critique from 'Ill ordinary language perspective. In order to appreciate how Heller sl<lnds between Aristotle and
Plato, though, more must first be said about one of Aristotle's central
chamcten;, the character of Justice.
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For all of Plato's thinking-through ofjllslice in reg:lrds to the city
of the soul or the city in the sky, IlcHer is developing, parlicul;uly in
BI:)'oml JlIs/iet', a Vi:lblc sm:io-political position, :lllU she thus requires
more practical guidelines (or cmlclles, as she might call them) to stand
wilh ami against. So Heller Hlrns to Ariswlle. who prescnls the par:!digmatic:l1ly formal response, the response of 'slalic justice', 10 the
question of how social connit:!S should he judged and Irc:lIClL While
'finding the mean' for fight action involves a deliberative process of
weighing opposing CXlreme.~. and while justice itself is weighed a.~ a
mean between doing and suffering injustice, Aristotle is unambiguous
on questions of how to judge and treat wrongdoers. The Aristotelian
idea of !Jroporri(JIIClfity involves the use of a common measure to be
employed in comparing or cOl11ra.~ting individuals or social groups.
PropOllionality, in other worus, only exists where there is a clear comlIlonality hetween people: insofar;.ls people llIay be consistently compareu, they ;.Ire, in some respect, equals. Just as we exchange COIllmodities accoruing to a shared, consistent judgmellt al)(lut their worth,
the common value between them, we judge people and group.~ only
with ;1 cOlllmon .~tandard against whidl they actually measure up.
The problem with the imperative of proportionality, fur Aristotle,
arises when there can be no proportionality between social groups, for
in .~tlch cases, the clarity and consistency allowed by proportionality
becomes u.~cless. As it turns out, many more people fail to enter into
relations of proportionality than achieve them. Slaves cannot he COlllpared with free people, men cmmot be compared with WOlllen, adults
cannot be compared with minors nor parents with their children. n The
a.~ymll1etry or social hierarchy that lhus results functions according to
another proportion: where right action means treating eqllal.~ equally,
it also means treating unequals unequally. One treats others, therefore,
always according to one's relative pl;\cement on the ;.lJ-inc1usive
social hierarchy; e<luals can tre;tt OIlC anothcr justly, and peoplc in
higher social positions may choose to be just 10 lhose of lower soci;d
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straw, but there can be no question of 'ju~tice' when a lower-ranking
person does anything for one higher-ranking. Slaves, women and children, in regard to freemcn, men and adults, may be obedient, faithful
and submissive, butncvcr jus!. In IIcller's words, "Under thc conditions of the all-embracing social hicr:Jrchy, both being just and being
unjust are prerogatives allotted (0 the repositories of social authority."24
Justice, then. occurs whcn an offense is disciplined or dismissed
by a higher authority. TIle authority judges according to the norms of
hi.~ own soci:LI group. In ,HI asymmetrical social configuration, :my
form of the so-called 'golden rule' (1\ should treat B as B should treat
A), is meaningless. Iteller identifies several connicls Iha\ tend to arise
from such an asymmetrical hierarchy, such as when people personalize their social connicts, targeting, e.g., the tax collector instead of the
tax system. People may also fight to establish 'rights' for lower strata, and, in cases in which legal rights arc /lot yet firmly established,
may exchange rights for ritu'lls of supplication. But while Heller
might be the first to allow that certain absolute, even if inexplicahle,
differences of the spirit may exist between individuals - while she
endlessly appreciates the aristocracies of intelligence, wit, integrity
and creali vity - Heller nowhere toler'ltes social hierarchy. Asymmetry
in the social. politiC'll or kg'll realms ex,lcerbates relations of connictual dependency and personal mediocrity; no viable social theory
or practice may withdraw from the establishment and complete application of exactly the same norms and rules to human beings.15
Heller's criticism of Aristotelian social asymmetry, then, is obvious, But what is panicularly interesting is the way that Heller then
uses the Aristotelian elaborations of retributive and distributive justice
to think-through her own suggestions. In his Politin}6 Aristotle clarifies the reasons for criminal behavior, which were also di.~cllssed, in

"llliJ. III.
IlliJ. 21.
16 ,\riSlo.llk, 'l"h~ C""'I'/el~ \V",'ks "/ ,\,.;,·,,,11<,,
PrinceLun U"iverli;ly Press, 19114. 1267a14.

l'

ll~rnes.

JUII~Ltlan

cd.. "rincclOn.

190

Ktltit' 'I€rezakis

lenns of virtues and vices. in txnh of his £,11/('$. ~n. for example,
II\3Y ~ rr.JcllL'cd 10 alleviate the hunlen... of poverty. OUI of an acquisitive de...ire improrer1y controlled, or for lhe !ih«r enjoynlC'nl of its
criminality. ArblOile. lM:refof"t. proposes lilt« distinct, officially
authorized responses 10 thef!: hdpmg to allevj.3lC' the burden of »O\'crly through emploY~n1 or ocher legal ~ans. leaching self-conlrol.
:Ind the lIltroduction 10 philosophy. "'hkh alone can leach people how
to covel nothing bUI their own vinue and excellence. Ireller returns 10

Aristotle's cluster of causes in order to identify three e.~nti:al reason...
for crimC'. She idemifies: I. slrong amI prim.ary social con...traints: 2.
strong intcrt'.'>l.'i or passions of a morally negalive bent: and 3. the
pleai>ure or kick of conuuining a crime. It IS important to notice Ihat
thallhe firsl category. social conslraims. does not include purely psychological conslr.lints. Ahhough reople do commil crimes for solely
psychological reasons. and although psychology play~ :I. part in each
of Ihe three primary categories J lelh:r distinguishes. !ohe lauds
Aristotle for r~cognizing Ihal crimes cOllullitled only under psychological cOlblraints can no longer he allribulcd 10 frce and rational
aclors. Wilhout the psychological calcgory. a crime may never be
fully e,'(pl:lil1~d. hut it can, via the application of one of the lhree feasible c:ll~gorie.~. he sufficicnlly llnrJcrlltouJ for judgrneru. correclion
or punishmenl.
l!eller's uniquc utilization of Aristotle manifeslS as ~hc puiS her
three borrowed c:ltcgorics to work. On the one hand. she ab...olulely in~isls (anJ this is emblemalic Ilcller) lhal all people are unique
tlnd cannOI he r:lIlkcd or compared as wholes. The di.~linclive biography of each actor is the grounJ for allY inlcrprclOltioll of her
aClions. Ollid no biographies Olre idcmical, or proporliollal. In
Ileller's words. "To grJ....p Ihe single case is a gr~Olt theorelical challenge Olnli the lIeed 10 meel Ihal challenge is perfeclly legilimale.'·n
Praclically speaking. f'Xp!tI;II;/IX 11'1/)' anyone persOIi commib a
crime rcsulls in an infinity of imerprelation.... l1lany uf them COlll-
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plete ;tnd even mutually exclusive. Yet. while psychologically fascini.ltinl:\, lind stimulating for the purposes of artistic exploration.
Heller gives two reasons for 1101 dwelling on a psychological
assessment of the criminal acl. In the fir.~t placc. uniqucncss cannot,
by definition, be ranked or compared. lind mnking or comparison is
precisely what is necessary for making judgments and meting out
punishments. Secondly. explllining the unique actions of II uni<lue
charllcter only through psychological motivations means, again,
rohbing the person judged of her rational choicc and freedom. So
on the one hand, lIelier rejects ArislOlle's social asymmetry
uncompromisingly, while on the other, she returns to the
ArislOtelii.ln imperative of proportion,,]ity, as well as to i.ln
Aristotelian notion of agency. to develop a position on the necessary rights :.llld obligations of citizens. Via a relatively rational,
decision-mi.lking process, which Aristotle identifies with prolUlire.\';$, each person can be understood as able to perform a mental act,
which itself entails accoulltability for authorship of her deeds.
Yet here is the ruh, in Heller. A judge encountering a criminal
whose reasons for crime fall under either the second or third of
Heller's categories (strong interests or passions of a morally negative
bent. or the pleasure of commining a crime) m.ly hold the criminal
fully responsible for her behavior. Whatever the details of the crimin::l's biography add to the expl<lnalion of her crime, the judge has at
her disposal ;\ proportionally equivi.llent legi.ll standard i.lnd a rational
agent to whom she I;an apply it. However, if the criminal act took
place as a result of the first category, strong and primary social constrains (such as extreme pOveJ1y), then the agent may be held only
partially responsible for her ;Iction.~. Moreover, it takes an impartial
judge to decide whelher thc criminal act was the result of severe constraints, as well as (Q judge thc particular criminal actor approprimcly
according to those constraints. Yet, as a member of a shared community, the judge is also jointly responsible for the said severe COIlstraints on the criminal. It is generally /lot the case that people jointly
responsihle for the constrained person's actions are concurremly
judged. in proportion to their responsihility, together with the social-
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Iy coo:olr,Jincd pen;on.... Out if Ihey are not present, or (.·,moot be
judged. especially if thai is hecause Ihey:are IIltjudg~, then there can
be 00 just, pr.lCtiC',Jble form of retribOlh'e juslice. As long a.. the fint
categol)' of 'criminals' e:(islS in a society - as long as people xt criminally in re."ponse 10 strong. primary social constr.llnu that ha\e nOi
yet been alle\'i,lIeU by the" hole communily together - th~n judging
criminality retributjvely cannot be fully jus!. And. in Ileller's words.
-Only full jusli(.·c is justice:'
So once ..galn.llellerrelUrnl> 10 Aril>tOlle. She t.;lL.cs up, finally. the
AriSimelbn notion of 'dil>tribulj\c justu:e' to recomrnenJ .. relalh'c.
equality in resources .;lnd proc:etIures as Ctlfluilions for Ihe good life of
the ("itizen and ,,-ily. And she gOCl> on 10 argue thatllil ethical-political
concepL~ of justice - and lhis applies most of 011110 her own - must be
backed up by lhe suslained elhics. lIlur.llilY and mor.ll prJctices ufreal
people. e\'en if few in number. Ahhough Ari:.lolle's asymmelric reciprocity pro\'idel> occasion fm crititlue, his political and dhicallhcory
:llso pm\'ides shoulders to siand on, for Ilcllcr is ultimately to COil·
c1ude lhal the besl possible socio-polilical world is nul just in itself.
but oper-lles by just proccdures.:'I She .;lrgues. having concluded her
examination of PlalOnic and ArL~tOle1ian juslke, that lhe establishment anu uefcnSt: of just prucedures will entail the valiuatinn of nonns
and mtcs Ihrough V:ttuc discour:.es guided by the universal maxim of
uynamic ju:-tke. Ilcller' s proposal of ~Iynalllic jll,~ticc is cr.lft("lI frorn
h~r re;lrr.lngelTl~1ll uf lradilional alld cCllllcmporary notions ;Ind praClices, including those Platonic and Aristotelian. 8;\'t'1l her OWII insis·
tem:e 1hal humanity be "iewed as Ihe eS!lelllbt !locbl group and that
lhis group's intemal relalion:- IlIU~1 be that of symmetric reciprocity.
In a way Ihat c,mnot bm remind the re..der or AristOlle's discussion,
;II Ihe end of his Nic'tll/w<'1,t'tlIl Et/licJ, of an outstripping notion of
human decency, which mOlY rectIfy even lhe Chtcnsibly just law, ;lrKl
of his daooratiun of Ihe vital human rriend:-hip, which incorpo......lcS
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all of the virtues but ha.'; no need of justice - Heller concludes her
book on ju.';tice with the assertion: "tfle good lift!, as (1/1 wlllivided lIIl/l
indil'isilAe wllo/e, i.f !Je}'o/UI justice ( ... J Ille goal ofjll,fric(' i.~ lIe}'ol/ll
jlls/ice, "1U

lIeller's vision of thc good life is il life of honesty, of the development of our best endowmcnts into talents, and of the strength of our
personal atlachments, It is honesty, the goodness and righteousness of
:lll individual, which binds these elements. Heller's whole enterprise,
she readily admits, in re:lffirming a definition of the good life with
which almost no one could argue, has been :.11 about answering the
question as to how an honest person is possible here, now, in thi.~
world today. Yet answering that question, for Heller, involved a
return to the cver-charged ancients. The quc.';tion, a.'; the .';cope of
Heller's work makes clear, :lIsa has:l counterp:lrt: how i.'; it possible
to extend the good life to others, 10 all others, 10 recrc:lte the condition.'; for the development of honest people? IleHer :lnswers this question too by juxt:lposing her position to th:lt of the Greek.';: "Equal life
chances for :III, equ:l1 freedom for all. and the regul:ltive idea of the
be.~t po.';sible socia-political world" arc to be conceived of :I.'; a goal.
Though we Illu.';t insist, in the here and now, on the life chances and
freedom of all, we may posit and .';trive IOw:lrd the be.';t possible sociopolitical world as a condition for sustaining those freedol1ls_ Like a
Plaia who 'tips the balance' to help hi.'; Socrates win a wager for our
cOl1lmitmenl to mor:ll goodness, and who po.';its a 'city in the .';ky' to
guide our political imagination, Ileller's theory email.'; the unprovable
insi.';tence on the charisma of goodness and the methodical use of the
regulative. Like :In Aristotle who defines and delimits justice in order
tn correctly judge its every possible application, but who finally leaps
free of Ihe conceptual ladder of justice in arriving :l1 the most corn·
pkte notions of human virtue and virtuous relation, Heller presents a

)II

Ibitl 326.

meticulous philosophical gel1c~llogy of the dmraclcf of Justicc, in
order 10 present lhe possihility of its still dynamic philosophical
dc\'elopmellt.
I beg:ll1 by rdaying lIelier's comlllent that each philosopher follows either in the train of Plato or of Aristotle, and perhaps this was
unfair, for it m;ty have created the expectation that, by paper's end,
lIelier could be proved ;l Platonist or an Aristotelian. [t would he at
least as unfair to :.allege, now, that lldler's work belies her claim, for
indeed, I believe thatllel1cr, like all of us, docs fol1ow one train more
than the other. With further examination of her assessment of Platonic
and Aristotelian metaphysics and aesthetics. one might gain a dearer
Sense of which train it is. Ilere, the focus has heen only on the question of justice in llcller'.~ readings of Plato and Aristotle. In both cases
what is most just. or complete justice, requires reference to a viable
ethics and a moral philosophy; Heller's presentation of hoth lllll.~t
likewise be further examined in order to finally appraise her st:lI1ding
as a moral philosopher as a reader of Ihe ancients. Nevertheless, from
Socrates' unprovable first principle of justice to Aristotle's discussion
of the decency and friendship that nourish beyond justice, we have
seen Ikller captivaled hy and committed 10 the notion of the whole
person - unique, irreducible, and, in any real dedication to eXlern;!1
justice, also intensely engaged in self-discovery and self-creation. So
it is fair, I hope, ttl urge an al1cntivcness not just to Heller's discussions of the acsthetics and lllewphysics of Plato and Aristotle. but to
her appreciation of the distinctive tell1pCralllenl.~ which unify Ihese
fields of investig:ltioll. Heller would \101 make the psychologislic
claim that we can infiltrate a thinker's ideas by first understanding his
psyche. She would not claim that we ever havc tr:ll1sparent :tccess 10
the minds of diamcters of our thinkers, or that, given cen;lin psychologit·al clues, we could do allY more than speculatively intcrpret thcm.
Gut lIeller would, I believe, agree with (:'oucault's contention that
philosophers and philosophies arc besl characterized not by epochs.
but by attitudes. neyollll what phi losophical ages or doctrines can typify, there is a positioning, a slance, and an approach that is like the
be:tl'ing of a theory ami its thinker. Through llcller's rellections upon
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and utiliz;uions of the Greeks, lhrough her embracing as much as her
rejection of their ideas, her awareness of lhe altilUdes of Plato and
Aristotle becomes dist"emablc. It is ill her appreciation of each altitude, and in the manifestation uf her own, thai the character of
Heller's lo\'C manife.~ts.

